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ALTERNATIVES TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT OF CONTINUED ENERGY-
UTILITY SERVICE AFTER NONPAYMENT
PAUL N. ARRINGTON*
Public utility companies provide services that most people consider
necessities,1 especially energy service which provides fuel for heat.
Since the mid-1970's, courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies
have established various safeguards to protect residential consumers
against the termination of energy service by public utilities.2 These
safeguards are attributable to the general trend of consumer protection
and the growing inability of low- and moderate-income consumers to
pay the continually increasing service rates.' These measures provide
much greater consumer protection than existed at common law.
Recently, several states have enacted laws that prohibit energy utili-
ties from terminating service to poor residential consumers during win-
ter months or when the outside temperature falls below a certain level.4
* J.D., Washington University, 1985.
1. Examples of such services are natural gas, electric power, purified running water,
sewage, and telephone communications. O'Brien, Protecting the Consumer in Utility
Service Terminations, 21 ST. Louis U. LJ. 452, 452 (1977).
2. See infra notes 18-42 and accompanying text.
3. O'Brien, supra note 1, at 452.
4. During the winter months of 1977 and 1978 Maryland had a moratorium on
shut-offs. Maryland currently prohibits termination of energy services on a day when
the temperature falls below 32 degrees Fahrenheit or when there is a forecast of contin-
ued cold weather. Maryland-Innovative Fuel Assistance, Conservation Programs Under-
taken, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1983, 49, 50. In 1979 the Connecticut legislature
adopted a statute that prohibited a utility from terminating service from November 1 to
April 15 to residential customers unable to pay their entire bill, and required utility
companies to reinstate service during this period to anyone previously terminated and
still unable to pay. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c(b)(1) (1983). In 1983 Kansas estab-
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This Note reviews the current state of the common law and the recent
changes that have occurred in this area. In addition, this Note exam-
ines the consequenes of regulations which prohibit service termina-
tions, and then suggests that alternative approaches to assisting the
underprivileged during winter months offer better solutions in terms of
equity and the efficient use of scarce resources.
I. COMMON LAW
At common law, most courts held that public utility companies
could adopt and enforce reasonable termination rules to deal with cus-
tomers who failed to pay for the service rendered.' In Oklahoma Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Young,6 the plaintiff was bedridden and required the care
of a nurse because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident.7
The defendant gas company sent the plaintiff a monthly bill due on
December 1, 1936. One week later the plaintiff had not paid her bill
and the company, in accordance with its established termination pol-
icy, discontinued her service. The company had full knowledge of the
plaintiff's condition and of the fact that she had no other means of
heating her home. The plaintiff subsequently contracted pneumonia.
lished a ban on utility shut-offs. Kansas-Cut-offs Limited by Utility's Customer Assist-
ance Program, PuB. UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1983, 49, 49. The Utah Public Service
Commission considered the adoption of a moratorium on shut-offs that same year.
Utah-Major Gas Distributor Experiences Decline in Shut-offs, Pun. UTIL. FORT.,
March 3, 1983, 50, 50. Arizona currently forbids the termination of residential service
when a customer is unable to pay her bill and when the temperature is 32 degrees
Fahrenheit or below. Ariz Admin. Comp. R. §§ R14-2-201, R14-2-211 (Supp. 1982).
The Minnesota Public Service Commission adopted a similar "cold weather rule" pro-
viding that no utility may disconnect residential service when the temperature on the
previous day falls below zero degrees Fahrenheit, and if the disconnection is scheduled
for a Friday or the day before a legal holiday the utility cannot disconnect service if the
low on the previous day fell below 32 degrees Fahrenheit. 11 MINN. CODE AOENcY R.
§ 279-376 (1976). Georgia utilities may not turn off service on days when the tempera-
ture is below freezing. Georgia-Commission Issues Regulations on Service Shut-offs,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1983, 49, 49.
5. 2 0. POND, PUBLIC UTILITIES § 668 (4th ed. 1932); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 914
(1941); see, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Young, 116 F.2d 720, 722-23 (10th Cir.
1940) (gas company can refuse service to consumer who fails to make payment); Sims v.
Alabama Water Co., 205 Ala. 378, 379-80, 87 So. 688, 689 (1920) (water company can
adopt and enforce a rule that it would terminate service after a consumer failed to pay);
Steele v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 184, 193 A. 613, 615 (1937)
(public utility can adopt and enforce regulations terminating service after nonpayment).
6. 116 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1940).
7. Id. at 721.
8. Id. at 721-22.
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She then sued the gas company for negligence.9
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the gas company owed
no legal duty to continue service to the plaintiff once she failed to com-
ply with the demand for payment of the overdue account."° The court
reasoned that a utility has a right to protect itself against "fraud, injury
or undue risk and liability, and to make rules for that purpose."' 1
Other courts suggest that requiring a utility to bring legal action in
order to collect overdue accounts is impractical and would result only
in a multitude of small suits. 2 Furthermore, the expense incident to
collecting relatively small monthly bills by legal process would be al-
most prohibitive.'"
Many courts recognize an exception to the public utility's right to
terminate service when there exists a bona fide dispute over the cus-
tomer's liability or the bill's accuracy. 4 When such a bona fide dispute
exists, some courts have held that the utility cannot terminate ser-
vice.' 5 Other courts have held a utility liable for damages if it termi-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 723-25.
11. Id. at 724 (citing Huston v. City Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Ill. App. 307 (1910)).
12. Huff v. Electric Plant Bd. of Monticello, 299 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. 1957); Siegel
v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 271 Minn. 127, 129, 135 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1965).
13. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 489-90 (1915). Other
scholars and judges have provided additional rationales for recognizing the utilities'
termination rights. The right to terminate service is "in the interest of efficient service
and fair treatment to all customers..." 0. POND, supra note 5, at § 668, p. 1291.
"The company's ability properly to serve the public largely depends upon" the prompt
payment for service. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. at 489-90.
These rules "are reasonable and necessary to properly protect" the utility's business and
maintain its efficiency. Central Louisiana Power Co. v. Thomas, 145 Miss. 352, 362,
110 So. 673, 673 (1927).
14. 0. POND, supra note 5, at § 668; Annot., supra note 5, at 915.
15. For examples of cases in which the plaintiffs obtained equitable relief (injunction
or mandamus), see Dodd v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S.E. 166 (1922) (injunction
granted preventing water company from discontinuing service for a bill's amount which
plaintiff disputed); Payne v. Kinloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, 67 S.W. 684 (1902)
(mandamus granted requiring telephone company to reinstate service after termination
for nonpayment of a disputed bill); Sickles v. Manhatten Gaslight Co., 66 How. Pr. 314
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884) (injunction granted preventing gas company from shutting off
service for nonpayment of a disputed bill).
For examples of cases in which the court recognized a right to monetary damages
after a utility terminated service for nonpayment over a disputed bill, see Barry v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 374 Ill. 473, 29 N.E.2d 1014 (1940) (plaintiff had valid cause of
action against electric company for damages after company terminated service for non-
payment of a disputed bill); Barrett v. Broad River Power Co., 146 S.C. 85, 143 S.E. 650
1985]
Washington University Open Scholarship
172 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:169
nates service and then the court resolves the dispute in the consumer's
favor.1 6 The same reasoning underlies both rules: because of the rela-
tive disparity in bargaining power the utility cannot coerce the con-
sumer into paying a bill that he in good faith disputes. To hold
otherwise would permit a utility to pass judgment on its own case.17
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the last ten years consumers have gained additional protection
against the termination practices of energy supplying utilities. In
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft8 the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 9 re-
quires a municipally-owned utility 0 to provide a pretermination notice
and hearing before exercising its right to discontinue service for
nonpayment.2 '
(1928) (electric company not liable for damages after terminating service when the dis-
pute pertained to a separate contract for construction).
16. See, e.g., Huff v. Electric Plant Bd. of Monticello, 299 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1957)
(company not liable when there was no dispute as to the correctness of the bill, but only
an unsettled claim of negligence); Steele v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 123 Conn.
180, 193 A. 613 (1937) (plaintiff had a valid cause of action against electric company for
damages allegedly caused from terminating service for nonpayment of a disputed bill);
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Warren Ellison Cafe, 231 Ky. 558, 21 S.W.2d 976 (1929)
(electric company held liable for damages resulting from the discontinuance of service
because of a disputed amount owed calculated by a faulty meter); Louisville Tobacco
Warehouse Co. v. Louisville Water Co., 162 Ky. 478, 172 S.W. 928 (1915) (defendant's
counterclaim for damages from water company's termination of service dismissed upon
a finding by the jury that the amount charged was correct).
17. See, e.g., Barry v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 374 Il. 473, 477, 29 N.E.2d
1014, 1016 (1940); Steele v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 185, 193
A. 613, 615 (1937); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 123 Tex. 157, 161-62, 70
S.W.2d 413, 415 (1934).
18. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ...
Id.
20. The fourteenth amendment requires due process only if "state action" is
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property." See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since Memphis Light, Gas
and Water Division (MLG&W) is municipally owned and controlled, the actions of
MLG&W are clearly "state actions." 534 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1976).
21. 436 U.S. at 14-16. The Supreme Court affirmed the position that several lower
courts had taken. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/7
TERMINATION OF ENERGY SERVICES
The Craft case involved a family who received two utility bills be-
cause their home had a dual set of gas and electric meters.22 The plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully attempted to resolve this problem with the utility
company. After the company terminated the family's service five times
for nonpayment, the Crafts filed suit in federal court claiming that the
terminations had occurred without due process of law.23 The Supreme
Court held that entitlement to continued public utility service is a
"property" interest24 protected by the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.25 The Court noted that Tennessee law recognized a
consumer's right to public utility service and prohibited service termi-
nation when a bill was in dispute.26 A pretermination notice must in-
(6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974)
(city providing water service violated due process for failing to provide a pretermination
notice and hearing); Koger v. Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (city provid-
ing water service did not give occupants a pretermination notice and hearing and re-
quired tenants to pay landlords arrearages before reinstating service violated the due
process clause); Donnelly v. City of Eureka, 399 F. Supp. 64 (D. Kan. 1975) (similar).
22. 436 U.S. at 4-5. The house served as a duplex before the Crafts moved there in
October, 1972. They received the first set of bills in the early part of 1973 and the utility
company continued to send two monthly bills until January, 1974. Id.
23. Id. at 1-5. The plaintiff was seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
Id. at I. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which reads in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proceeding for redress.
Id.
24. See supra note 19. The district court held that continued utility service was not
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court and held that continued utility service was a fourteenth amendment
property interest. 534 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1976).
25. 436 U.S. at 11. The fourteenth amendment protects state deprivations of "prop-
erty, without due process of law." U.S. CONST., supra note 19. A plaintiff must estab-
lish that he has a certain property interest that a state actor has taken from him. The
Supreme Court rarely has defined the concept of "property." Courts have held that a
plaintiff can establish a property interest by showing that she has a legitimate claim of
entitlement protected by the due process clause. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
602 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 365 (1975) (entitlement and property interest found in attending a public
school); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (entitlement and property interest found in
drivers' license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (entitlement and property in-
terest found in welfare benefits).
26. The underlying substantive interest constituting "property" is created by "an
independent source such as state law;" federal constitutional law determines whether
1985]
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form the public utility customer not only of the possibility of
termination, but also that a procedure existed for challenging a dis-
puted bill." In addition, the Court held that due process required a
hearing where the customer could appear before a designated company
employee and present billing complaints.2 8
Realistically, the Craft decision does not afford all consumers protec-
tion. Craft involved a public utility that was subject to fourteenth
amendment, state-action constraints.29 Most utilities, however, are
that interest rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement" protected by the due
process clause. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Under Tennessee law public utilities are obligated to provide services to all citizens
except for good cause and the courts have held that utilities may not terminate service
"at will". 436 U.S. at 9-12. Therefore, because the utility can terminate service only
"for cause," the consumer can assert a "legitimate claim of entitlement" within the due
process clause. Id. The Court relied upon Farmer v. Nashville, 127 Tenn. 509, 156
S.W. 189 (1913), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that public utilities were
obligated to provide service to all of the inhabitants of the city in which it operated,
without discrimination, and without denial, except for good cause (such as failure to
pay for service). Id. at 514-15, 156 S.W. at 190. The Court also relied upon Trigg v.
Middle Tennessee Elec. Membership Corp., 533 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) in
which the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a utility could be liable for terminating
service when the controversy involved a disputed bill. Id. at 733.
27. 436 U.S. at 13-15. The "final notice" contained in MLG&W's bills stated only
that payment was overdue and that MLG&W would discontinue service if payment was
not made by a certain date. Craft, 534 F.2d 684, 688 n.4 (6th Cir. 1976). The Supreme
Court found that the utility's notification procedures were adequate to warn of the
threat of termination of service, but did not reasonably inform customers of the availa-
bility of "an opportunity to present their objections." 436 U.S. at 14 (quoting Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The Court noted that the
purpose of notice under the due process clause is to apprise the individual and provide
adequate preparation for a hearing. 436 U.S. at 14.
28. 436 U.S. at 16-19. The Court stated that "some kind of hearing is required at
some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests." Id. at 16 (quot-
ing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)). After discussing the balancing
approach outlined in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court stated that
some administrative procedure for hearing customer complaints before termination is
required "to afford reasonable assurance against erroneous or arbitrary withholding of
essential services." 436 U.S. at 17-18. The Court also noted that the utility could termi-
nate service after it afforded the opportunity for a hearing when it was determined that
the amount billed was justly due. Id. at 18-19.
29. Courts rarely characterize private utilities as state actors. Courts have taken
two different approaches in examining private conduct for state action: 1) the public
function approach and, 2) the joint participant approach. The theory of the public
function approach is that when a private individual assumes obligations or supplies
services normally provided by the state, the individual's conduct becomes state action.
The joint participant approach focuses on the interrelationship between state and pri-
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privately owned.3" Despite the absence of fourteenth amendment pro-
vate actor rather than the type of activity involved. Substantial contact between state
and private actor can establish state action. Note, Constitutional Safeguards for Public
Utility Consumers: Power to the People, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 506-10 (1973); Note,
Public Utilities, The Tests for State Action, 12 URB. L. ANN. 153, 165-71 (1976).
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court
refused to find that a privately-owned utility was a state actor. Id. at 348 n.2. The
Court held that the utility was not performing a public function because state law im-
posed no obligation on the state to furnish utility service; it only required a utility com-
pany to supply service on a reasonably continuous basis. Id. at 352-53. The Court also
rejected the contention that state action was present because the state had granted Met-
ropolitan Edison monopoly status. The Court stated that this fact is not determinative
in deciding whether state action exists. Id at 351-52. Finally, the Court held that the
state and the utility were not joint participants. The state utility commission's approval
of a private utility's proposed business practice does not transform the utility's business
practice into state action under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 354-57.
See also the following cases, which involve privately-owned utilities, for examples of
when courts rejected state action arguments: Cody v. Union Elec. Co., 518 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1975), Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949 (10th cir.
1975); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972); Particular
Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1972); Strack v.
Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Taglianetti v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 R.I. 351, 103 A.2d 67 (1954).
But see the following cases, which involve privately-owned utilities, for examples of
when courts accepted state action arguments: Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.,
479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) (statute authorizing company to enter the premises of a
customer to disconnect for nonpayment after a twenty-four hour notice); Ihrke v.
Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815
(company required to pay the city in which it operated 5% of all revenues received);
Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., 400 F. Supp. 358 (D. Vt. 1975) (service terminated
upon specific instructions from public service board after negotiations conducted by the
board failed to resolve the conflict); Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Co., 378 F. Supp.
964 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (city received flat rate fee and 2% of gross receipts from company
revenues); Salisbury v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn.
1973) (statute requiring utilities to pay 56% of the public service commission's ex-
penses); Denver Welfare Rights Org. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Colo., 547 P.2d 239
(Colo. 1976) (public service commission adopted a termination rule after initiating rule-
making proceedings and conducting two days of hearing); Sokol v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966) (commission ordered service termina-
tion if law enforcement officials advised the telephone company that the customer used
service for unlawful purposes).
30 A. FINDER, STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 4-6 (1977). For
example, in 1976, electric companies owned by a sponsoring governmental unit pro-
vided electncity for 13.5% of the nation's electrical consumers and billed only 16.4% of
the total kilowatt hours consumed in this country. Privately-owned electric companies
controlled by individual stockholders or holding companies, serviced 77.1% of all elec-
tric customers in 1976 and billed 78.7% of the total kilowatt-hours consumed. Electric
cooperatives serviced the remaining consumers. Id.
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tections, specific state statutes 31 and regulations governing notice and
hearings32 protect customers of privately-owned utilities.
31. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2702-17 (reissue 1983); N.Y. TRANSP. CORP.
LAW § 15 (McKinney 1955) (amended 1981). See also infra notes 32-42 and accompa-
nying text.
32. See, e.g., ARIz. ADMIN. Comp. R. §§ Ri1-2-211 to R14-2-212 (Supp. 1982);
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 16-3-100; 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16, 4-1-17, 5-1-16,
5-1-17 (1984); 807 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 50:006 (1984); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R.
§§ R460.2163-91 (1979 and Supp. 1981); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.1-143.9,
275.1-275.9 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC 113.132, 113.134, 134.062, 134.064
(1983). See also infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
Courts generally recognize that a state may exercise its police power to regulate both
privately-owned and publicly-owned businesses that devote their property to public use,
like utility companies. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Supreme Court
referred to these businesses as "affected with a public interest." Id. at 126. The Court
broadened the scope of this phrase in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), stating
that: "[I]t can in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for ade-
quate reason, is subject to control for the public good." Id. at 536. For examples of
cases when the Court has upheld statutes based on a state's police power, see Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (statute regulated employment agencies), and Daniel v.
Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (statute prohibited life insurance compa-
nies and undertakers from engaging in both businesses).
As of 1977, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Is-
lands had established regulatory commissions that exercise general regulatory power
over privately-owned gas and electric utility companies. A. FINDER, supra note 30, at
17. For example, the Pennsylvania statute reads: "The commission shall have general
administrative power and authority to supervise and regulate all public utilities doing
business within this Commonwealth." 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b) (Purdon
1979). The term "public utilities" is defined so as to include privately-owned utilities.
Id. at § 102. The New York statute provides in pertinent part: [The Public Service
Commission shall]
1. Have general supervision of all gas corporations and electric
corporations ...
2. [E]xamine or investigate the methods employed by such persons, corporations
and municipalities in manufacturing, distributing and supplying gas or electric-
ity . . . and have power to order such reasonable improvements as will best
promote the public interest, preserve the public health, and protect those using
such gas or electricity ...
5. [W]henever the commission shall be of opinion. . . that. . . the acts or regu-
lations of any such person, corporation, or municipality are unjust, unreasona-
ble, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential . . . the commission shall
determine and prescribe . . . the just and reasonable acts to be done and
observed. ...
N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAW § 66 (McKinney 1955).
The Supreme Court recognized a state legislature's authority to regulate a utility's
termination practices in Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490
(1915). See also Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 363 Mass. 474,
295 N.E.2d 876 (1973) (state regulatory agency has authority to adopt termination
regulations).
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Notice provisions generally require that the company send the con-
sumer written notice five to thirteen days prior to the scheduled termi-
nation date.33 The notice must state that the account is past due and
inform the consumer of the date service will be terminated if the bill is
not paid. Utilities send a pretermination notice after an account is de-
linquent, usually twenty to thirty days after the company mails the
monthly statement.34 In addition, the notice must inform the customer
that a deferred payment plan is available. Finally, the notice must in-
clude information on how a consumer may dispute a bill's amount.35
The hearing provisions generally require that a utility company ap-
point a reviewing officer to handle disputes and attempt to reach a set-
tlement with the customer.36 After a customer lodges a complaint, the
officer must investigate, and shortly thereafter, make a written determi-
nation. The officer must notify the complainant that he may appeal the
decision.37 The public service commission hears all appeals. The com-
mission initially provides an informal review; it later holds a formal
33. See, e.g., ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R14-2-211(E)(1) (1982) (5 days); CONN.
AGENCIES REGS. § 16-3-100(d)(IXA) (13 days); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(E),
5-1-16(E) (1979) (7 days); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R460.2163 (1979 & Supp. 1981)
(10 days); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-2702 (Supp. 1982) (7 days); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
16, §§ 143.1, 275.1 (1983) (5 days); WIs. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC 113.132, 134.062
(1980) (8 days).
34. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP. R. §§ R14-2-210(c)(3), R14-2-211(c)(1)(b)
(1982) (15 days); CONN. AGENCIES REGs. § 16-3-100 (30 days); 170 IND. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 4-1-13, 4-1-16, 5-1-16 (1979) (17 days); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ R
460.2102, .2116, .2162, .2163 (1979) (26 days); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC 113.132,
134.062 (1980) (20 days).
35. See, e.g., ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R14-2-211 (1982); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 16-3-100(d)(2)(E); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(6), 5-1-16(6) (1979);
MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R 460.2164 (1979 & Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-
2704 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.2, 275.2 (1983); Wis. ADMIN.
CODE §§ PSC 113.132, 134.062 (1980).
The deferred payment plans prohibit a utility company from terminating service if
the customer agrees to pay all future bills on time, and agrees to pay an amortized
portion of the delinquent amount over several months. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP.
R. § R14-2-210(H) (1982); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(c), 5-1-16(c) (1979);
MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R 460.2170 (1979); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.15,
275.15 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC 113.133, 134.063 (1980).
36. See, e.g., ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R14-2-212 (1982); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 4-1-17, 5-1-17 (1979); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ R 460.2165, .2166, .2169, .2181,
.2184-.2186, .2191 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2705, 19-2174 (Supp. 1982); N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.8, 275.8 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC 113.134,
134.064 (1980).
37. Id.
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review." During this dispute resolution process, a utility company
cannot terminate services.39
Two other protections afforded consumers pertain to the actual prac-
tice of terminating service. First, a utility company cannot terminate
service on a day, or the day before, the company's business office is
closed.4° This policy insures that a customer who desires to reinstate
service quickly can tender payment without having to wait several
days. The second protection prohibits termination of service to a resi-
dence when termination would aggravate an existing medical emer-
gency.41 A statement by a physician or a public health official usually
is required to confirm the existence of such an emergency. A medical
emergency will extend the pretermination period ten to thirty days.42
III. ANALYSIS
At Congress' urging,4 3 some states prohibit utility companies from
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Aliz. ADMIN. CoMP. R. § R14-2-212(B)(1)(c) (1982); CONN. AGEN-
CIES REGS. § 16-3-100(b)(3)(D); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(c), 5-1-16(c) (1979);
MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ R460.2166, 460.2187 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-2708
(Supp. 1982); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.8, 275.8 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§§ PSC 113.132(1), 134.062(1) (1980).
40. See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGs. § 16-3-100(b)(3)(N); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE§§ 4-1-16(c), (d), 5.1-16(c), (d) (1979); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R460.2151 (1979);
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.5, 275.5 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC
113.132(10), 134.062(10) (1980).
41. See, e.g., ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R14-2-211(A)(2)(E) (1982); CONN. AGEN-
CIES REGS. §§ 16-3-100(b)(3)(c), 16-3-100(e); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(c), 5-1-
16(c) (1979); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R460.2153 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-2704
(Supp. 1982); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16 §§ 143.12, 275.12 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§§ PSC 113.132(8), 134.062(8) (1980).
42. See, e.g., ARiz. ADMIN. COMP. R. §§ R14-2-211(A)(1)(e)(i), R14-2-211(A)
(1)(g) (1982) (10-day extension allowed if the customer agrees to enter into a deferred
payment plan); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 16-3-100 (b)(3)(c), 16-3-100(c) 16-3-100(e)
(renewable 15-day extension if the customer agrees to an amortization plan for the out-
standing amount); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-1-16(c), 5-1-16(c) (1979) (10-day exten-
sion renewable for up to 20 days); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. § R460.2153 (1979) (21-day
extension); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-2704 (Supp. 1982) (30-day extension); N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 16, §§ 143.12, 275.12 (1983) (15-day extension); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ PSC
113.132(8), 134.062(8) (1980) (21-day extension renewable for up to 42 days).
43. Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-11 (1982), 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45 (1982), to promote the conservation of electric
energy and natural gas. A portion of the Act requires each state's utility regulatory
agency and non-regulated utilities to make a determination as to whether it would be in
the state's interest to adopt and implement any of several rate designs and regulatory
standards promulgated by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 3203 (1982), 16 U.S.C. § 2623 (1982).
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terminating service during the winter months or when the temperature
falls below a certain level." Connecticut even requires a utility to rein-
state service during these periods to consumers who have had their
service disconnected but still cannot pay their outstanding balance.4"
The rationale of these provisions clearly reflects a legitimate concern:
the danger to the life and health of those without heat during extremely
cold weather. '
At first glance, these provisions appear inequitable. They require a
utility company to provide services to nonpaying customers. At com-
mon law, most courts were sympathetic to this reasoning and permit-
ted the utility to terminate service upon non-payment.4' Given the
typical rate-making formula,48 however, and the relatively low elastic-
The states are not required to adopt or implement any of these standards; they are free
to adopt any standard so long as they comply with the Act's regulations concerning the
procedures that state commissions must follow when acting on proposed federal stan-
dards. For a discussion of the Act's constitutionality see Comment, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1983-84). The pertinent
part of the Act's regulatory standards reads:
1) No gas (electric) utility may terminate natural gas (electric) service to any gas
(electric) consumer except pursuant to procedures described in section
3204(a)/(2625(g)) of this title...
2) during any period when termination of service to a gas (electric) consumer
would be especially dangerous to health, as determined by the State regulatory
authority ... and such consumer establishes that-
A) he is unable to pay for such service in accordance with the requirements
of the utility's billings, or
B) he is able to pay for such service but only in installments,
such service may not be terminated.
15 U.S.C. § 3204(a) (1982), 16 U.S.C. § 2625(g) (1982).
44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c(bXl) (1983).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. Other accounts noted by the press in-
clude: Aged Man Dies; Home Lacked Heat, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Dec. 23, 1983,
at 1, col. 4; Man Seventy-One Freezes to Death After Utility Shuts Off Gas, Boston
Globe, Feb. 19, 1974, at 17, col. 1.
47. See supra notes 5, 10-13 and accompanying text.
48. Utility companies are guaranteed a certain amount of revenue based on a
formula used by regulatory agencies. The formula reads as follows:
RR = E + rr (v - d), where:
RR = Revenue Requirement
E = Expenses
rr = rate of return
v = valuation of plant investment
d = depreciation
Edwards and Matthews, Ratemaking: Fair Value vs. Original Cost-Contemporary
Problems, 24 HOWARD L.J. 151, 153 (1981). Thus, the utility recovers its operating
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ity of demand4 9 these bad debt expenses normally are passed on to
"paying" consumers in the form of higher rates."0
This cross-subsidization51 of utility service presents the actual ineq-
uity. The inequity lies not, however, in the fact that those that "have"
provide for those that "have not," for this is consistent with the na-
tion's general philosophy favoring income redistribution.2 Rather, the
inequity arises from the fact that those who rely on alternative sources
of energy53 do not shoulder a proportionate share of the burden im-
posed by the increased rates because they use a share of utility-supplied
energy54 that is disproportionate to that used by the average consumer.
expenses and also earns a rate of return on its capital investment. Utility rates are then
based upon this revenue requirement. T. GRONIGER, PUBLIC UTILITY RATEMAKING
166 (1928). See also, A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 45-51
(1969); F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 256-58, 437-
44 (1968).
49. J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 135 (2d ed. 1980). The
price elasticity of demand is defined as "the proportional change in the quantity
purchased divided by the proportional change in price." Id. at 133. If a product or a
service has a low elasticity of demand, consumers will not decrease their consumption
after an increase in price by as much as they would with a product or service having a
high elasticity of demand. Id. at 126-36.
50. Bad debt expenses are part of the operating expenses contained in the rate-mak-
ing formula. These expenses, therefore, partially determine the revenue requirement
and hence, play a role in determining utility rates. As bad debts increase, rates will also
increase. See supra note 48; Chambersburg Gas Co. v. P.S.C., 116 Pa. Super. 196, 224-
25, 176 A. 794, 805 (1935) (bad debts recognized as part of operating expenses within
the rate-making formula); C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 401 (1969).
For example, a Utah utility company's primary concern while considering a regula-
tion prohibiting service termination was the effect of the proposed regulation upon util-
ity rates. Utah-Major Gas Distributor Experiences Decline in Shutoffs, supra note 4, at
50.
51. Cross-subsidization, as used herein, refers to situations where profitable opera-
tions provide the revenue to offset other unprofitable operations. For example, cross-
subsidization can occur in other areas of utility service, where a company is required to
provide service to a small rural area whose revenue does not pay for the full cost of the
installation and service, thereby requiring users in the larger areas to subsidize the loss.
C. PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 401.
52. See generally J. LAPATRA, PUBLIC WELFARE SYSTEMS, 130-46 (1975). An ex-
ample of the income redistribution philosophy is the graduated federal income tax. 26
U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
53. Examples of alternative sources of energy are solar, wood, and kerosene. The
actual number of alternative energy users is surprisingly large. According to the Bureau
of the Census' 1981 Annual Housing Survey, 25.3% of all households use nonutility
supplied energy in the primary heating system in their dwelling. 1983 DEPT. OF EN-
ERGY-ANN. ENERGY REv. 19.
54. Some alternative energy users, such as owners of solar energy units, do not use
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Thus, the current system allows alternative energy users to "free-ride"
at the expense of most consumers. 5
As rates inevitably increase56 during this subsidization process, a
major problem arises. Climbing rates could force some paying con-
sumers into the group of nonpaying consumers. In addition, other
consumers that are not actually priced out of paid service will choose
cheaper, alternative sources of energy. Both of these results further
decrease the group of "paying" consumers and the accompanying loss
of revenue will increase rates to an even higher level. This cyclical
process could significantly increase the number of people who comprise
the nonpaying group and the number of people requiring financial
assistance.
The final problem with this subsidization process is that it fosters
economic inefficiency. Generally, as the price of a good or service de-
creases, the quantity a consumer will purchase for use increases. 58
This is especially true with regard to energy.59 Thus, with the incen-
any utility-supplied service; those who use wood or kerosene to heat their homes may
continue to use utility service for cooking, lighting, and other non-heating tasks. In
either case, these alternative energy users consume much less utility supplied service
than used by the ordinary consumer.
55. The "free-rider" concept in economics involves individuals who attempt to
avoid personal expenditures for a good, hoping that others will provide the necessary
expenditure for them. "In short, individuals will tend to try to take a 'free ride' at the
expense of his neighbours." Inland, The Calculus of Philanthropy, in THE ECONOMICS
OF CHARITY 66 (1973). See also Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON.
357 (1974).
56. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
57. This absurd result obviously violates the most basic of welfare objectives: to
provide for those that are without the necessities of life. "Every simple economic re-
form inflicts a loss upon some people. Reforms should have the characteristic that they
will allow a compensation to balance the loss and still show a net advantage." J. LAPA-
TRA, supra note 52, at 135.
58. J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 49, at 27-28.
59. M. WEIDENBAUM, BuSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 119 (1981).
The pattern of energy consumption by Americans demonstrates this phenomenon. The
Eisenhower Administration's import quotas on oil, along with the Federal Power Com-
mission's 1954 practice of setting wellhead prices for natural gas at levels substantially
below market prices, encouraged greater domestic consumption of energy and economic
inefficiency. The nation on balance consumed far more oil and natural gas than it would
have consumed under a free market system. Id. at 115-20. Statistics support this con-
clusion. From 1973-1976, after the 1973 oil embargo and during an escalation in the
world price of oil, consumption in the United States rose by 1%. In countries where
consumers paid the world price, as opposed to a governmentally controlled price, con-
sumption declined. For example, in the United Kingdom, consumption decreased 17%,
in West Germany consumption decreased 7.6%, in France consumption decreased
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tive to conserve removed, nonpaying consumers will tend to use more
energy than they would if they had to pay for the service.' This phe-
nomenon will accelerate depletion of nonrenewable energy resources
and increase the amount paying consumers must contribute to meet
rate increases.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Alternative action by both the government and the private sector
6.5%, and in Japan consumption decreased 5%. G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, ECONOMIC
POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES 180-88 (1977).
60. Charts A and B below demonstrate that during the period of Maryland and
Connecticut's moratorium on shut-offs, utility companies in these states experienced a
much higher level of bad debts expense than that experienced by utility companies in
surrounding states.
Chart C illustrates the decline in bad debt expenses after the Maryland public service
commission lifted the moratorium. Furthermore, this decline occurred when bad debt
expenses at many utility companies in the surrounding area increased.
CHART A
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CHART B
MARYLAND (1977-79)
100-
80 -
60-
* i 40-
i 20-
0-
0 0  6mo . CA A. 0
Bad Debts as a Percentage of Gross Revenues
CHART C
MARYLAND (1979-81)
V
'U
V6 6 .
U . c. .
'04 ~4) 0. GO 0-
Bad Debts as a Percentage of Gross Revenue
Compiled from S.E.C. 10-K Reports on file at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Washington, D.C.
The amount of bad debts expense incurred by the four companies in Connecticut and
Maryland is a significant amount; the three companies in Connecticut have incurred
$25.9 million in bad debts since the moratorium was enacted in 1981. Baltimore Gas &
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should be considered as a solution to the inequities 61 and economic
inefficiencies 62 inherent in the present system. First, instead of the pay-
ing consumers absorbing the cost of providing service to the financially
disabled, federal, state, and local governments should undertake this
task. The government should shift expenditure priorities to eliminate
any additional financial burden on taxpayers. If a shifting of expendi-
tures is not feasible, then the public service commissions should de-
crease utility rates by an amount equal to the necessary increase in
taxes. For most consumers this would not result in an increased finan-
cial burden and would eliminate the inequity that exists by equalizing
the contribution from all taxpayers.
This alternative does not, however, eliminate the economic ineffi-
ciency that results from nonpaying consumers having no incentive to
conserve energy. Instead of these consumers receiving unlimited utility
service, the state or local government should grant limited assistance.
63
Ideally, the government should strive to develop an administratively
feasible system that would provide the approximate amount of service
that each consumer needs to maintain a particular comfort level.
Under this system, the government could make direct monthly pay-
ments' to the utility companies for each qualified 65 recipient in an
amount equal to the average utility usage for that consumer's particu-
lar dwelling.66 Fluctuations in average monthly utility usage due to
Electric Company alone had $8.5 million in bad debt expense during the 1977-79 pe-
riod. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
63. Limiting assistance for utility service is consistent with other public assistance
programs. For example, the Federal Food Stamp Program only grants recipients a lim-
ited amount of stamps to purchase food. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(o), 2017(a) (1982).
64. Direct payments to the utility companies would ensure that the assistance pro-
gram provides the service the government intended.
65. An entitlement criteria is necessary so that "paying" consumers are not in-
cluded in the group that receives utility assistance. For example, Connecticut prohibits
termination in "hardship" cases, defined as: "a) a customer receiving local, state, or
federal public assistance, and b) a customer whose sole source of financial support is
Social Security, Veterans Administration or unemployment compensation benefits."
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c(b)(l) (1983).
Requiring entitlement to a separate assistance program decreases a program's admin-
istrative costs because administrators do not have to independently determine the finan-
cial merit of each claim.
66. Computing a monthly wage usage average should not present a problem for the
utility companies given the present capabilities of computerized record keeping.
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outside temperature would require payment adjustments.67 Consum-
ers would then have to pay for any usage beyond the amount the gov-
ernment provides or face temporary termination for nonpayment.68
Temporary heat shelters are another alternative that state and local
governments should consider.69 These shelters provide the necessary
heated environment at a lower per capita cost than is required for heat-
ing individual dwellings. Such an arrangement not only grants the
needed assistance to those individuals who cannot make any payments
exceeding the governmentally provided amount, but also helps those
that have not yet qualified for assistance.
Greater assistance in the insulation of homes and apartments is also
needed. This type of aid significantly reduces heating costs so that
some consumers could then pay their entire bill. Several utility compa-
nies already have initiated such assistance, providing free or low-cost
installation service.7° Some companies also offer advice and consulta-
tion through energy workshops.7'
The government also should require level payment plans like the
plans adopted in Georgia.7" These plans permit a consumer to pay
equal monthly bills. The company estimates a yearly utility usage cost
and divides that by twelve to arrive at the monthly bill amount.73 Such
plans eliminate the burden on fixed income consumers who face winter
bills that are much greater than other monthly bills. While many utili-
ties currently offer this service, the state public service commissions
should require all utilities to provide such plans.
67. For example, if a community used 10% more energy in a particular month than
the previous average for that same month, then the government would increase utility
payments by 10%.
68. Termination in this instance would only last until the government made its next
monthly payment.
69. The City of St. Louis, Missouri, currently provides such shelters under its "Op-
eration Weather Survival." The Disaster Operations Department works closely with
private charities in establishing shelter sites. The city makes public facilities available
after private shelters become filled. Interview with Chuck Badgett, Deputy Director of
the Disaster Operations Department of St. Louis (July 27, 1984).
70. See, e.g., Connecticut-Major Conservation Programs Offered, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
March 3, 1983, 48, 48-49; Maryland-Innovative Fuel Assistance, Conservation Programs
Undertaken, supra note 4, at 50.
71. See, e.g., Kansas-Cutoffs Limited by Utility's Customer Assistance Program,
supra note 4, at 49; Minnesota-Energy Workshops, Energy Bank, Among Programs
Available to Ratepayers, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1983, 50, 50.
72. Georgia-Commission Issues Regulations on Service Shutoffs, supra note 4, at 49.
73. Id.
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Finally, private donations can provide substantial assistance. Sev-
eral utilities have made large contributions from retained earnings to-
ward funds established to assist in the payment of winter heating
bills.74 In Minnesota, one utility company mailed pledge cards to cus-
tomers asking how much they would care to contribute monthly to
such a fund." Each customer then had that amount added to his bill;
the effort resulted in the collection of more than $250,000.76
V. CONCLUSION
In the last ten years the various branches of government have estab-
lished numerous safeguards and protections for residential consumers
of utility-supplied energy. The common law rationale for permitting
utility shut-offs-that a denial of this right would result in great ex-
pense to the utility companies-no longer applies to the present system
of guaranteed rates of return." Statutes and administrative regulations
that prohibit termination of energy services during the winter months
provide nonpaying consumers with unlimited utility service during this
season and no incentive to conserve energy. Such a system is illogical,
inequitable and inefficient. State and local governments should now
oversee the social policy of providing utility service to the poor, ensur-
ing the protection of health, but without permitting waste of limited
resources.
74. See, e.g., California-Innovative Program Provided by the Nation's Largest Utility,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1983, 48, 48; Maryland-Innovative Fuel Assistance, Conser-
vation Program Undertaken, supra note 4, at 49-50. Because the contributions are from
retained earnings they do not represent an expense that is passed on to the consumer.
75. Minnesota-Energy Workshops, Energy Bank, Among Progams Available to Rate-
payers, supra note 71, at 50.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 48-50.
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